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Constitutional Law-IMPAIRMENT
OF CONTRACTS-PYRAMID
SALES
POWER
SCHEMES-REMAINING
LIMITATIONS,
IF ANY,ON THE POLICE
UNDER THE CONTRACT
CLAUSE-KOSCO~
Interplanetary, Inc. v.
Draney, 530 P.2d 108 (Nevi 1974).
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (Koscot) sold cosmetics in Nevada through the use of a "pyramid promotional scheme." In
1971, Nevada enacted a statute, hereinafter referred to as chapter
598, which prohibited all future pyramid schemes and made contracts entered into prior to the effective date of the statute voidable if the right to participate in a pyramid promotional scheme
formed any part of the consideration.' Before chapter 598 became
effective, plaintiffs contracted with Koscot for the right to participate in a pyramid plan and paid Koscot the contract price. After
the effective date of the Act, plaintiffs requested Koscot to refund
their investment and, upon refusal, s;ed for rescission.
The District Court for the Second Judicial District of Nevada
found that the contract was voidable under chapter 598 and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Koscot appealed,
claiming that the portion of chapter 598 making contracts entered
into before the enactment of the statute voidable violated the
contract clauses of the United States2and Nevada constitution^.^
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute was a legitimate use of the police power and was therefore valid even though
contractual obligations were affected.

A. Pyramid Sales Plans and the Legal Efforts to Control Them
Pyramid sales organizations have been a source of controIn a typical pyramid situation, a
versy since the mid-1960'~.~
participant pays a substantial sum to obtain a company position
and attempts to recover his investment through commissions
1. NEV.REV.STAT.$ 5 598.100-.I30 (1973).
2. U.S. CONST.art. 1, $ 10, provides: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ."
3. NEV.CONST.art. 1, § 15, provides: " No . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall ever be passed. . . ."
4. See Comment, Multi-Level or Pyramid Sales Systems: Fraud or Free Enterprise,
18 S. DAK.L. REV.358 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Multi-Level].
For additional information on pyramid schemes and comment on various suggested
solutions to the pyramid contract problem see Comment, Federal Regulation of Pyramid
Sales Schemes, 1974 U. ILL.L.F. 137; Comment, Toward a Uniform Approach to Multilevel Distributorships, 8 U. MICH.J.L. REF.546 (1975); and Note, Regulation of Pyramid
Sales Ventures, 15 WM. & MARYL. REV.117 (1973).
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from product sales and from additional commissions received by
enlisting others in the organization. This right to receive substantial commissions by persuading others to buy a company position
distinguishes pyramid schemes from traditional marketing methods and is often the most financially rewarding right gained from
pyramid contract^.^
The major source of fraud found in pyramid schemes is that
returns on investment usually come from position-selling rather
than from product sales. Often the market for the product cannot
support the huge sales organization which develops, and those
participating in the plan can make money only by enticing others
to join. When new recruits are found, they then face the same
problem previously faced by those who persuaded them to join:
they cannot effectively sell the product and must therefore try to
. ~ fundamental
enlist others to recover their i n ~ e s t m e n t This
weakness of endless-chain schemes is amplified by the tendency
to misrepresent earnings in terms of what is remotely possible
instead of informing prospects of what is actually earned in reallife situations.'
Because pyramid plans have frequently been used as a vehicle for fraud, legislative and judicial reaction to these schemes
has been swift. Many states have prohibited pyramid promotional schemes by name or through expanded consumer fraud
statutes? A few states allow such schemes but strictly regulate
them.g In the absence of legislation specifically aimed at pyramid
contracts, courts have invalidated many such contracts on the
grounds of fraud,1° restraint of trade," security registration viola5. See Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t 359-67.
6. Even if the product is marketable, recruits find it easier to find new recruits than
to sell. Because of the principles of geometric progression and the incentive to get others
to join, the market is easily saturated with'an over-abundance of sellers. As a matter of
mathematical certainty, the plan will fail somewhere along the line unless participants
expect income to come basically from product-selling. Id. a t 365-67.
7. One commentator stated: "Because the 'plan' often looks better on paper than it
works in practice, it lends itself to being manipulated by clever and sophisticated people
. . . ."Id. at361.
8. Id. a t 380 & n.133.
9. See, e.g., MD. ANN.CODEart. 83, 5 166 (Supp. 1974); MASS.GEN.LAWSch. 93, 5
69 (1973); S.D. COMPILED
LAWSANN.5 37-25-01 to -28 (1975).
10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624
(Iowa 1972); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682
(Super. Ct. 1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Speaker v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., Equity
Docket No. 57 (C.P. Erie County Pa. 1970).
11. See Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682
(Super. Ct. 1972). Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t 372-74.
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tions, l 2 unconscionability, l 3 and as illegal lotteries. l4
The Nevada statute contested in the present case, chapter
598, differs from other legislation in this area in that it makes prelegislation pyramid contracts voidable in addition to prohibiting
future pyramid schemes. Legislation prohibiting future pyramid
promotional schemes has been upheld.15Prior to the present case,
however, no statute making voidable pyrarnid-scheme contracts
entered into and paid for before its passage. had yet been challenged.

B.

T h e Contract Clause

1. Legislative history

'

From the scant legislative history available, it appears that
the contract clause of the federal Constitution was originally intended to have an effect in civil actions similar to that which the
ex post facto provision has in criminal matters? On August 22,
1787, the Constitutional Convention adopted a provision forbidding Congress, the national legislature, from enacting any ex post
facto law.I7 Six days later, on August 28th, Rufus King moved to
add a provision prohibiting the states from interfering "in private
contracts."lR Many delegates opposed the proposal, fearing that
such a far-reaching clause would excessively hinder state legislatures. Proponents assured the critics that King's provision prohibited only retrospective interferences.lg Nevertheless, the dele12. See, e.g., Hurst v. Dare to be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973); Frye v.
Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii
642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore.
App. 284, 482 P.2d 549 (1971); State ex rel. Park and McEldowney v. Glen Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUESKYL. REP. fi 71,023 (4th Dist. Ct. Idaho 1972).
Not all courts, however, have defined "investment contract" to include pyramid
contracts and have held the security requirements to be inapplicable. See, e.g., Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See generally MultiLevel, supra note 4, a t 375-78; Annot., 47 A.L.R.3rd 1366 (1973).
13. See State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); People ex rel. Kelley v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 447,195 N.W.2d 43 (1972); Multi-Level, supra
note 4, at 370-72.
15. See State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d
416 (1973).
16. See B. WRIGHT,THE CONTRACT
CLAUSEOF THE CONSTITUTION
4-26 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
17. Crosskey, The Ex-Post Facto and Contracts Clauses in the Federal Convention:
A Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. CHI.L. REV.248, 248-49 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Crosskey].
18. Id. a t 248.
19. WRIGHT,
supra note 16, a t 9; Crosskey, supra note 17, at 248-49.
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gates did not adopt King's motion a t that time. Rather, they
adopted a substitute motion by John Rutledge prohibiting the
states from enacting ex post facto laws or, as recorded in Madison's notes, "retrospective laws."20 The following day, August
29th, John Dickinson, according to some sources, advised the
Conventionthat the term ex post facto was used at common law
only in criminal actions.21The Convention responded with the
contract clause; its purpose, under the most widely accepted
view, was to insure that ex post facto concepts would be extended
to civil matters.22Significantly, this civil-criminal distinction was
where the United
adopted in the 1798 case of Calder v.
States Supreme Court, at least partially influenced by the assumption that the contract clause performed an equivalent function in the civil area,24limited the ex post facto clause to criminal
matters.
While the economic uncertainty and debtor relief measures
prevalent prior to the Constitutional Convention have encouraged speculation that the contract clause was inserted to promote
economic stability, the records of the Convention provide little
direct support for this position. The faint light shed by those
20. WRIGHT,
supra note 16, a t 9 & n.16.
21. Id. a t 10 & n.21.
Professor Crosskey, however, asserts that the incident involving John Dickinson probably never occurred and that James Madison invented the episode in order to promote
his personal beliefs concerning the role that the contract clause should play. Crosskey
further argues that Madison consciously omitted key details and deliberately altered his
records of the Convention in an effort to create the illusion that the contract clause was
an extention of the ex post facto clause. See Crosskey, supra note 17, a t 248-54.
22. See WRIGHT,supra note 16, at'4-16.
If Professor Crosskey's position that Madison made misleading statements is accepted, however, the idea that the contract clause was originally intended to apply ex post
facto protections in limited civil areas is not as obvious (See note 21 supra). Nevertheless,
the fact that proponents of the contract clause specifically told their critics that the clause
would only prohibit retrospective interferences has not been challenged, and the response
of those critics demonstrates that Madison's belief that the contract clause prohibited
retrospective legislation was shared by others. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
Furthermore, given the confusion that existed concerning the scope of the ex post facto
clause, Rutledge's substitute motion may have been intended to prohibit both civil and
criminal ex post facto measures. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
23. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
24. The Court said:
The restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to secure the person of the
subject from injury, or punishment in consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights
from being affected, or injured, by such laws, . . . the other restraints
[embodied in the contract clause] I have not enumerated, were unnecessary,
and therefore improper, for both of them are retrospective.
Id. a t 390 (emphasis in original).
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records reveals only its relationship to the ex post facto clause25
described above. Consequently, the development of the contract
clause into "a mighty instrument for the protection of the rights
of private property"26was the result of judicial activism.27
2.

The contract clause and judicial activism

The initial Supreme Court decisions concerning the contract
clause extended the protections of the clause to grants,2Rcont r a c t ~ and
, ~ ~charters30to which the state is a party, and demonstrated the judiciary's determination to preserve the sanctity of
~ ' Court declared
contracts. For example, in Fletcher v. P e ~ k , the
unconstitutional an act that revoked an earlier grant of land even
though the initial grant was obtained through fraud and bribery.
In New Jersey v. Wilson,32the state was told that it could not
revoke a contractually-incurred grant of perpetual tax immunity.
This insistence that legislatures could not alter significant terms
of contracts was most forceably declared in Sturges v.
C r ~ w i n s h i e l dwhere
, ~ ~ Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the
Convention appears to have intended to establish a great princi~ ~ held that state
ple that contracts should be i n ~ o i d a b l e , "and
bankruptcy laws could not affect contractual debts incurred before passage of the bankruptcy laws.
3. Limitations on the scope of the contract clause

Although these early cases conveyed the impression that contracts were virtually immune from legislative interference, limits
25. WRIGHT,supra note 16, a t 8-18.
26. Id. a t 28.
27. Id. a t 27-61.
28. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
29. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
30. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
31. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
34. Id. a t 206.
Marshall also described the purpose of the clause in the following forceful terms:
So much mischief was done, and so much more was apprehended, that
general distrust prevailed, and all confidence between man and man was destroyed . . . .
To restore public confidence completely, it was necessary not only to prohibit the use of particular means by which it [economic mischief] might be
effected, but to prohibit the use of any means by which the same mischief might
be produced.
Id. a t 204, 206.
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to the power and scope of the contract clause gradually appeared.
Initially, the Court distinguished between the "remedy" and
"obligation" parts of the contract stating that reasonable alterations of available remedies were permissible if the "obligation is
not substantially impaired."3J The impact of Sturges was further
cushioned by the decision in Ogden v. Sa~nders,~%hichestablished the principle that the contract clause poses no barrier to
laws which only affect contracts concluded after the legislature
has acted. Later, in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix," the Court
stated that the state's power of "eminent domain" is an "inalienable state right" which can be exercised even though such exercise might affect contractual rights. Nevertheless, throughout
most of the nineteenth century the courts, despite these early
limitations, continued widespread use of the contract clause to
invalidate state l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~
As the "police power" concept gained in prominence, however, the clout of the contract clause began to diminish. Because
the states have an affirmative duty to promote the "health,
safety, morals, and general welfare" of their citizens, it became
apparent that the existence of a few contracts could not and
should not prevent the state from enacting laws necessary to prevent future harm to its citizens.39Initially, this "police power
rationale" was used to uphold laws that prevented parties from
fulfilling contractual obligations made illegal by subsequent leg, ~ ~High
islation. For example, in Beer Co. v. M a s s a c h u ~ e t t sthe
Court upheld a state prohibition law intervening between creation and execution of contracts for the sale of beer. Similarly, in
,~~
prohibiting lotteries was upheld
Stone u.' M i ~ s i s s i p p ilegislation
even though previously-issued lottery tickets could not now be
used.
Modern decisions have relied upon the police power rationale
to permit legislatures to further manipulate specific contractual
35. This distinction mentioned in Sturges v. Crowninshield (id. a t 207) was elaborated in Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), where the Court held that certain
changes in the state's mortgage-foreclosure laws so changed the "remedy" that the entire
"obligation" was impaired.
36. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1819).
37. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
38. During the 19th century, the contract clause was used more than any other
constitutional provision to invalidate state legislation. WRIGHT,supra note 16, at xii.
39. See WRIGHT,
supra note 16, a t 193-213; Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: 11, 57 HARV.L. REV.621, 654-63 (1944); Comment, The Continuing Vitality
of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 S. CAL.L. REV.576, 586-89 (1967).
40. 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
41. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
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terms. Foremost among these cases is Home Building and Loan
. ~ ~that case, the Court upheld a law
Association v. B l a i ~ d e l l In
passed during the depression which prohibited mortgage foreclosures over a two-year period so long as the mortgagor paid rent,
taxes, interest, and insurance during the extension period? Although the case could conceivably have been decided on the traditional view that reasonable modifications of available remedies
are permissible or on the basis that the state was exercising its
emergency powers,"44the decision rested upon the assertion that
states can alter specific contractual provisions under the aegis of
the police power." Nevertheless, while asserting broad state
power to modify contracts, the opinion is also riddled with descriptions of the economic emergency facing the nation, illustrations of ways in which substitute provisions provided by the contested act adequately compensated and protected the mortgagee,
and statements explaining that the police power could not be
allowed to destroy the limitation against impairment of cont r a c t ~As
. ~a~result, one is left with the clear impression that this
power to alter contractual terms is limited."'
One limitation on the use of police power to modify or impair
contracts is the requirement that legislation must actually promote t h e public welfare. In Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Asso~iation,~Vhe
United States Supreme Court found that the
contested statute did not actually promote the public good but
only changed the relative positions of the contracting parties visa-vis each other. The Court struck down the statute involved,
holding that a contract-impairing statute must promote the public welfare and not simply the private welfare of one of the con66

42. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
43. Id.
44. See, WRIGHT,
supra note 16, a t 109-11; Comment, T h e Continuing Vitality of t h e
Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 S . CAL. L. REV.576, 586-89 (1967).
45. 290 U.S. a t 444.
46. 290 U.S. 398, 415-48.
The balance which needs to be struck is best illustrated in these words:
The reserved power [police power] cannot be construed so as to destroy the
limitation [against impairment of contracts], nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects.
Id. a t 439.
47. Although Wright's conclusion that Blaisdell merely decided the "very narrow
question of the validity of the particular statute under the specific circumstances then
existing" is over simplistic, the Blaisdell opinion does indicate that there are definite
limits placed upon the police power's ability to impair contractual obligations. S e e
WRIGHT,
supra note 16, a t 119.
48. 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
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tracting individuals." The Court then added that even if a
contract-impairing law does promote the public good, the law
must be "reasonable" and "reasonably adapted" to achieve the
desired results before it can be found to be valid?
Several post-Blaisdell cases indicate that statutory schemes
which modify contractual obligations to a greater extent than
necessary to achieve the legislative ends are "unreasonable" and
therefore uncon~titutional.~~
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
, ~ ~Supreme Court refused to validate a mortgagev. R a d f ~ r dthe
foreclosure moratorium similar to that upheld in Blaisdell simply
because the provisions in the Blaisdell statute requiring payment
of reasonable rent and taxes during the extension period were
absent.53In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,54legislation passed
during the Depression which exempted insurance policy benefit
payments from garnishment was invalidated because no time
limits were placed upon the act and because no attempt was
made to differentiate between debtors who could afford to pay
and those who could not.55 A similar result was reached in
Worthen Co. v. K a ~ a n a u g h where
, ~ ~ procedures used to protect
property owners and to enforce bond payments were so substantially changed that the Court struck down the legislation as oppressive and unne~essary.~'
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the contract
clause, City of El Paso v. S i r n m o n ~held
, ~ ~ that a law which substituted a five-year right of redemption for an original grant of an
49. Id., a t 195, 197.
50. Id. a t 197.
51. It is incorrect to assume that the only requirement for the validity of contractimpairing legislation is that it be rationally related to a public end. An examination of
Blaisdell and post-Blaisdell cases indicates that legislation with a rational basis will, when
a contract clause attack is mounted, receive close judicial scrutiny. Many laws that
impaired the obligation of contracts more than necessary to achieve the desired public
result have been held unconstitutional. Cf. WRIGHT,supra note 16, at 111-19.
52. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
53. In his majority opinion, Justice Brandeis asserted that no substantive right was
impaired in Blaisdell because of the compensatory provisions which the statute in that
case provided. Absent those provisions, the statute in Radford impaired substantive
rights. Id. a t 581.
54. 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
55. Id. a t 434.
Distinguishing the Blaisdell case, Justice Hughes restated his opinion that the police
power "must be construed in harmony with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation''
and that the police action "must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate . . . to
the exigency to which the legislation was addressed." Id. a t 433-34.
56. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
57. Id. a t 60-63.
58. 379 U S . 497 (1965).
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unlimited right of redemption on land sold by the State of Texas
over fifty years earlier was, in light of the circumstances, a valid
and reasonable exercise of the police power. In upholding this
change, the Court stressed the insignificance of the modification
and noted that the reinstatement provisions were nonessential
terms that did not induce the original investors to enter into the
contract." The emphasis placed by the Court on the trivial nature
of the modified terms has prompted suggestions that unless the
legislation is of the type that makes contractually-obligated conduct illegal, major contractual terms cannot be modified if adequate substitute provisions are absent? At the very least, the El
Paso decision demonstrates that the public good to be accomplished must be weighed against the contractual rights lost in
determining a statute's "reas~nableness."~~

The Nevada Supreme Court relied heavily on the traditional
"police power" analysis formulated in Home Building and Loan
Association u. BlaisdelP2 to reach its conclusion that existing contracts could be invalidated by legislative action." The court
briefly reviewed the methods used by the defendant in Nevada
and concluded that the defendant's contracts and policies were
"nothing but a fraudulent scheme."" The abuses found in the
defendant's operations demonstrated the need for legislative protection from such plans. After noting that the legislature has wide
discretion in enacting laws and that such laws carry a presumption of validity," the court summarized its response to the contract clause challenge in these words:
Although contracts previously entered into may be affected
thereby, the constitutional interdiction against the impairment
of the obligation of contracts does not prevent a state in the
reasonable exercise of its police power from enacting laws intended to benefit the public.6fi
-

-

59. Id. a t 514, 516-17.
60. See Kraft & St. John, T h e Contract Clause as the Guardian Against Legislative
Impairment of Municipal Bondholders' Rights, 6 SETONHALL L. REV.48, 59 (1974).
61. The tenor of the entire El Paso opinion suggests that the degree of public welfare,

the importance of the term which is altered, and the availability of less onerous methods
are all to be weighed to determine a statute's validity. See generally 379 U.S. at 517-35
(Black, J . dissenting).
62. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
63. 530 P.2d a t 112-14.
64. Id. a t 112.
65. Id. a t 113.
66. Id.
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In response to the defendant's contention that the police
power could only impair contracts in emergency situations not
found in the present case, the court properly concluded that an
emergency situation is not a prerequisite to the valid exercise of
the police power. It then reiterated its belief that for a contractimpairing law to be valid it need only promote the public welfare,
by stating that "where the police power is exercised 'for an end
which is in fact public,' contracts must yield to the accomplishment of that end."67Finally, the court concluded that regulation
of pyramid sales contracts was an "end which is in fact public7'
and that the entire statute was therefore va1idF

A.

The Court's Use of Prior Contract Clause Cases

The historical development of the contract clause and the
holdings of several post-Blaisdell decisions demonstrate that the
power to modify contractual obligations is not unlimited. In
reaching its conclusion t h a t making prelegislation contracts
voidable was a legitimate use of the police power, however, the
Nevada Supreme Court failed to wrestle with and apply limiting
features of the contract clause that, given the facts of the instant
case, ought to have been applied. This failure was due in part to
the court's misplaced reliance on or misapplication of several
prior contract clause cases. Before examining that particular difficulty with the court's decision, however, an undoubtedly correct
aspect of the decision merits comment.
Certain provisions of chapter 598 prohibit future pyramid
sales contracts." Those provisions must, however, significantly
affect existing contracts, given the fact that the right to earn
commissions from position-selling is the most important right of
pyramid contracts. Nevertheless, the state's right to protect its
citizens from the harm which it reasonably believes will occur
from a continuation of pyramid-selling practices cannot be
thwarted simply because the exercise of that right will, in the
future, affect already-existing contracts. Indeed, the futureoriented provisions of chapter 598 are, in substance, analogous to
s ~ ~ prohibited
the statute upheld in Beer Co. u. M a s s a c h ~ s e t t that
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. a t 114, quoting Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
530 P.2d a t 114.
NEV. REV.STAT.$ 5 598.110-.I30 (1973).
97 U.S. 25 (1877).
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future sales of alcohol. Given the continuing validity of the Beer
Co. case, the court's determination in the instant case that the
similar provisions of chapter 598 are constitutional is sound.
Other provisions of chapter 598 are aimed directly at alreadyexisting contracts and a t past actions, in that prelegislation contracts may be voided by the purchaser. It was in that part of its
decision upholding these provisions that the court misapplied
precedent. The cases used by the court to support its holding
dealt solely with statutes affecting or regulating contractual obligations that had not yet been performed. In effect, the court
extended the police power rationale of those cases to permit retroactive invalidation of completed contractual transactions. But
the United States Supreme Court, in its contract clause cases,
has never upheld a statute prohibiting or altering contractual
obligations that the parties had performed. For example,
Blaisdell did not concern mortgage foreclosures that had already
occurred, but only prevented future foreclosures for a two-year
,~~
future lotperiod.71Similarly, in Stone v. M i s ~ i s s i p p ialthough
teries were prohibited, the sellers of lottery tickets were not required to return purchasers' money.
Regarding the statutes upheld in prior cases against contract
clause attacks, it may well be that, as a result of a statutory
prohibition of future actions required by existing contracts, specific contracts were voided by subsequent court action. But the
purpose and the direct effect of the legislation reviewed in those
cases was to protect the public from anticipated future harm. By
contrast, that portion of chapter 598 that makes existing contracts voidable is designed to compensate for past ills incurred as
a result of completed contractual performances. With respect to
the scope given a state's police power, the present case thus goes
although expanding
further than other cases in the area.7"et,
the police power to allow for the modification of executed contrac71. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
72. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
73. The word "retroactive" itself causes some confusion, because it is used in two
different contexts in legal analysis. In one set of circumstances it refers to the effect of
laws on events which have terminated before legislative action. In the second context,
retroactive laws affect rights which were received in the past, but, in the absence of
legislation, would not reach fruition for some time in the future. Both types of retroactive
legislation have been disfavored, but, a s has been shown, courts have allowed some retroactive legislation of this second type. See Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL.L. REV.216, 216-20 (1960).
The present case involves the first type of retroactive legislation which has not received even the small amount of validity given to legislation of the second class.
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tual provisions poses significant additional questions concerning
existing limitations on the police power, the rationale relied upon
by the Nevada Supreme Court to make this extension was simply
a restatement of the rationale developed to permit a state to alter
future contractual actions. The court provided no new justifications.
B. Public or Private Welfare?
One of the most significant limitations on a state's ability to
constitutionally impair contracts is the requirement that the
impairing legislation promote the public welfare and not merely
the welfare of one of the parties to a contract.74Unquestionably,
the regulation of pyramid sales contracts is an "end which is in
fact public;" however, as previously noted, that purpose was accomplished by making future contracts illegal. The provisions
making existing contracts voidable aids only the parties to the
contract that had succumbed to Koscot's inducements by giving
them a simplified legislative remedy to be used in the place of
existing judicial re me die^.^"
It could be argued that legislation that helps even a small
number of parties to existing contracts is an "end which is in fact
public." Some support for this position can be found in the fact
that the law upheld in Blaisdell significantly benefited mortgagors. Nevertheless, the quantum of public interest involved in
insuring that large numbers of individuals do not lose their homes
and farms, and hence their very livelihood, is significantly greater
than that involved in facilitating a few individuals to recover
their investment without going to court. Furthermore, the statute
upheld in Blaisdell was designed to preserve the agricultural sector of the state's economy and not merely to provide a simplified
remedy.7" review of post-Blaisdell decisions reveals that statutes upheld against contract clause attacks have consistently
benefited the public generally and that any benefit accruing to
the parties to the contract was incidental to the promotion of the
general public welfare. Since modification of executed contractual provisions-part of the chapter 598 scheme-is by its very
nature concerned with past harm, only the contracting parties
will be significantly affected, and the public interest involved
74. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
75. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
76. 290 U.S. a t 422-23, 437, 446.
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when the legislature is not acting to prevent future harm is minimal.

C. Retroactivity
Assuming, however, that the public welfare requirement is
met, retroactive voidability can be challenged on another basis.
As was demonstrated earlier, the legislative history of the contract clause shows that it was intended to function much like the
ex post facto clause, limiting the effect of legislation to acts which
are yet to be performed.77Furthermore, the initial Supreme Court
decision interpreting the contract clause, Fletcher v. Peck,'%eld
that legislation could not be retroactively applied to invalidate
earlier state grants of land even though those grants were obtained by bribery. Thus, the retroactive voidability provisions of
chapter 598 appear to violate a fundamental touchstone of the
contract clause.79
Since the present case involves a contract that is, technically
speaking, partially executory (Koscot would have a continuing
obligation to supply cosmetics and to pay commissions earned
from product sales), it might be distinguished from Fletcher v.
Peck. It is doubtful, however, that anyone would desire to continue selling Koscot's cosmetics absent the possibility of earning
income from position-selling-a possibility destroyed when pyramid schemes were made illegal. As a practical matter, therefore,
the executory aspect of the contract is a phantom, and the basis
for distinguishing Fletcher v. Peck must be deemed unavailable.
In any event, the contested retroactive provision of chapter 598
deals with actions and rights secured in the past, and exemplifies
the civil application of an ex post facto-like measure in a manner
contrary to the spirit and purpose underlying the drafting of the
contract clause.

D. Alternative Theories of Recovery
Finally, the statute goes further than necessary to achieve
the desired result of providing those who have been defrauded
77. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
78. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
79. Expressing his belief that the ex post facto and contract clauses had similar
purposes, Marshall stated that:
This rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law . . . . This
cannot be effected in the form of an ex post facto law, or bill of attainder; why
then is it allowable in the form of a law annulling the original grant?
Id. a t 138-39.
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with a reliable means of recovering from their mistake~.~"ince
chapter 598 eliminated the possibility of making money from
future sales, and since that possibility was in fact the most significant benefit provided by Koscot's contracts, existing contracts
could be judicially voided on a theory of frustration of purpose.
In addition, the court found that Koscot's operations were "nothing but a fraudulent scheme,"81indicating that a theory of fraudulent misrepresentation pleaded in the alternative would also be
successful.
One conceivable justification might be presented to
overcome these problems with the court's decision: the retroactive application of chapter 598 simply allows the parties to do in
one step what would normally take two. As previously mentioned,
existing contracts similar to Koscot's can be rescinded on a frustration of purpose theory, since future pyramid contracts are prohibited. As a result, the provision making existing contracts voidable, as a practical matter, does no incremental damage to the
sanctity of contracts and only makes it possible to omit an unnecessary and perfunctory trip to the courthouse.
If it were possible to limit the holding of the case to those
situations where contemporaneous legislation prohibiting future
conduct would invariably result in the invalidation of existing
contracts because of fraud or frustration of purpose, such an argument would be supportable. A judicial determination that invalidation would inevitably occur in every imaginable case, however,
simply may not be possible. For example, in the pyramid sales
area, a few pyramid sales schemes, primarily found in the Midwest, have been found to be legitimate marketing methods in that
the pyramiding is controlled and commissions from product sales
do in fact provide the fundamental source of income." In such
cases, a frustration of purpose claim might not be supportable;
the contract would thus be immune from rescission, and a statute
making existing contracts voidable would cause some incremental harm to the interests that the contract clause was designed to
protect. Nevertheless, since most of the pyramid schemes operating in the western states are clearly "nothing but a fraudulent
scheme," it is conceivable that a court reviewing a statute chal80. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
81. 530 P.2d a t 112.
82. See Multi-Level, supra note 4, a t 358, 390-93, where the author states that controlling the abuses of pyramid schemes by intelligent legislation would be a practical
alternative to outlawing such plans altogether, because a few pyramid plans are not
fraudulent.
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lenged under the contract clause could accurately determine that
all pyramid contracts in a specific jurisdiction would ultimately
be invalidated in any event.

IV. CONCLUSION
Absent a determination, however, that all contracts embodying a pyramid sales scheme would ultimately be voided under
traditional contract principles, the instant case must necessarily
be viewed as stretching the police power rationale beyond its
current limitations. That extension can only be justified if one is
prepared to do what the court in the present case refused or failed
to do expressly. Sufficient public interest would have to be found
in the fact that only a few individuals who are parties to existing
contracts are benefited. The pervasive idea that legislatures are
to enact laws which cover future conduct only would have to be
rebutted,83and the legislative history of the contract clause would
have to be rewritten. Further, one would need to rationalize the
fact that the retroactive provisions of chapter 598 or statutes like
it do little to promote the general welfare and are not necessary
to provide defrauded parties with an adequate remedy.
The right of contract is a constitutionally-guaranteed right.
While the state necessarily has power in certain circumstances to
modify contractual terms to protect the public, this power should
be kept in check so as not to seriously impair a doctrine of longstanding constitutional authority. In particular, the constitutional limits placed upon the legislature's power to impair contractual obligations ought not to be diluted beyond the present
limits which permit only the reasonable prohibition or alteration
of contractual duties to be performed in the future.
--

-

83. See generally Smead, T h e Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 M I N N .L. REV.775, 776-94 (1936).

